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Articles 
PHILIP DEVINE, "THE MORAL BASIS OF 
VEGETARIANISM," PHI! OSOPHY 53, pp. 481-505. 
Once upon a time, not too long ago (1978), 
Philip Devine wrote a fable in which he tried 
to undermine two olausible defenses of vege­
carianism: the utilitarian, according to 
which eating animals is wrong because of the 
animal pain required to produce th7 m7at; 
and a position which condemns the k~~hng of 
animals because it is killing. Dev~ne con­
cluded his fable with a defense of species­
ism. In this paper I will first examine 
Devine's discussion of utilitarianism as 
a basis of vegetarianism, and then turn to 
his own defense of species ism. Since I 
hope to show that Devine has badly mis­
applied utilitarianism, there is no n~ed
to focus on his discussion of the wrongness 
of killing. 
Devine's primary goal is to undermine
 
the following utilitarian def7nse o~ vege­

tarianism: "killing and rear~ng an~mals
 

for food causes more pain than it causes
 
us pleasure," and so "the practice is for
 
triat reason morally objectionable" (485).
 
In criticizing the utilitarian argument
 
Devine assumes "that animals are capable
 
of suffering pain, and do in fact suffer
 
pain in bein~ reared and slaughtered for
 
food" (485). '" But because "animal exper.­

ience is so lacking in intensity that tne
 
pains of animals are overridden b~ th~
 

pleasures experienced by huma~ ~e~n~s ,
 
(491), Devine rejects the ut~l~tar~an s
 
crucial calculation that "animals suffer
 
more pain in being killed and reared f~r
 

food than human beings enjoy pleasure ~n
 

eating flesh" (485).
 
Devine offers two reasons for thinking 
that animal suffering lacks the requisite 
intensity. First, since animals are 
"incapable of telling [us] that they. are 
in pain, as distinct from (s~y~ moan~n? .. 
[this] may well justify ascr~b~ng to tnem 
pains of much less intensity than those 
we ascribe to human beings" (436). Second, 
since humans can intellectualize about pain, 
"animal pain is conceptually defective". 
and "there seems no good reason to res~st
transposing [this conceptual defectiveness] 
into lack of intensity" (486). Devine also 
says he can make the same point in a diff­
erent way. Since "pain involves elements 
both of emotion and sensation ... it is 
highly plausible to maintain that non-human 
experi­animals--even supposing that they 
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ence pain as a sensation as intensely as 
hUillans do--experience far less suffering" 
(486). In short, animal suffering has a 
"lesser conceptual richness. A cow may 
experience some distress at losing her 
calf, but it makes little sense to speak 
of her grief" (486). 
The inability to talk is not related in 
any way to an inability to experience in­
tense pain (if that is part of Devine's 
argument). Nor would the lack of an 
ability to conceptualize, in Devine's 
narrow sense of verbalize, show that anim, 'ls 
cannot experience emotions. Animals can 
perceive, recognize, remember, figure out 
how to do things--abilities which are suffi­
cient to guarantee that animals will have, 
in addition to sensations, emotions,l 
unless Devine makes it definitionally true 
that to be able to experience an emotion an 
entity must be able to verbalize. Such a 
reply would, besides begging a crucial 
question, conflict with an overwhelming 
amount of evidence that animals do exper­
ience emotions, including the only one 
Devine mentions, grief. 2 
Perhaps, of course, Devine has in mind' the 
epistemological relationship between the 
ability of an animal to talk and our ability 
to know whether, or how much, it is suffering. 
But if there is a problem about knowing wno 
or what besides me experienc~s pain,this 
problem will not allow anyone to pretend 
that whether, or how much, a creature suffers 
is resolved by discovering that it utters 
stat~ments like 'It hurts.' Whatever deep 
diffi~ulties may arise in using moans and 
writhings as criteria for saying that 
another creature suffers will also arise for 
using language as such a criterion: that 
some creatures can replace a scream of pain 
with an utterance using the word 'pain' 
alters neither our a~cription of pain nor 
our evaluation of its intensity. In 
short, Devine provides no good reason for 
thinking that animal suffering is less 
intense than human suffering. 
ihat Devine has not provided good reason 
for making light of animal suffering in 
comparison to human suffering is a deva­
stating comment on ~is view of the utili­
tarian justification of vegetarianism. But 
no less devastating is his failure to ta~e
the utilitarian defense seriously enough 
to check out the human side of the utili­
tarian calculation. Even if animal suffering 
were less intense than human suffering, the 
utilitarian would still need to know whether 
there was enough human pleasure derived from 
the taste of meat to outweigh the requisite 
animal suffering. 
The human abilities to verbalize and con­
ceptualize often, in fact, prevent us from 
appreciating sensations as they present them­
selves to us. This fact, the fact of inatten­
tion to immediate sensation, suggests t.'lt 
humans typically do not enjoy tastes to dny 
great intensity, which is the critical 
experience on the human siae-of the utili­
tarian calculation. On the animal side of 
the calculation it is even worse: animals 
have no complex conceptual mechanisms to 
distract them from the painful sensations 
they experience while they are caged, prodded 
and slaughtered. It is very dubious, for 
example, to think that a family at MacDonald's 
experiences so much pleasure from eating 
their hamburger in such a distracting en­
vironment that this pleasure overcomes even 
a fraction of the frustration, pain and 
terror that the cow had to undergo in order 
wind up on a sesame seed bun. 
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This observation may suggest that whatever 
pleasures humans experience due to eating 
meat is to be compared with whatever suffer­-
ing animals undergo. But that is not the 
crucial utilitarian calculation. Rather, 
the utilitarian is only interested in the 
amount of pleasure which would oni~ occur 
were we to eat meat and which wou not 
occur were we to eat tasty vegetable-s-­-
instead. That is the amount of pleasure 
which is a consequence of eating meat 
(as opposed to eating in general). Since 
much of the world's population finds that 
vegetarian meals can be delightfully 
tasty, there is good reason for thinking 
that the pleasures which people derive 
from eating meat can be completely, or 
nearly completely, replaced' with pleasures 
from eating vegetables. Hence, animal 
suffering would have to be so unintense as 
to leave the animals nearly indifferent in 
order for the utilitarian calculation to 
permit the eating of meat. Since this is 
false, utilitaraianism prohibits the eating 
of meat and provides a solid moral basis for 
vegetarianism. 
Devine concludes his fable trying to defend 
and justify a moral principle for treating 
nonhuman animals differently because they 
are not humans (498-504). His apology for 
species ism is the following: "anthro­-
pocentricity of some sort cannot be avoided. 
Morality is a human phenomenon, and the . 
moral words are words in human language" 
(504). But Devine overlooks the vast 
difference between (1) being a member 1)f 
the human species, and so being unable to 
avoid using human language; and (2) bei.ng 
a human speciesist, and so using human 
language to attempt to justify treating 
nonhumans differently simply because they 
are nonhumans. Although it is true that 
we cannot help being members of the human 
species, we can stop being speciesists, 
and carefully evaluating the relevant 
arguments may help. 
Like many fables, Devine's fable about 
ethics and animals provides us with a moral: 
being philosophical about animals involves 
more than just rationalizing a set of con­-
ventional beliefs, whereas acting morally 
toward animals, at least if one is a 
utilitarian, involves being a vegetarian. 
Bart Gruzalski 
Northeas~ern University 
lOne could maintain that having an emotion 
requires making an assessment which is (a) 
conceptual in nature and (b) beyond the 
scope of animals. But, as William Alston 
points out, (a) is highly controversial, 
and to assume such a view as true would be 
to beg a highly controversial question in 
the philosophy of mind (see "Emotions and 
Feelings," Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967), 
pp. 479-486). But even if (a) were true, 
to assume, in addition, that (b) is true 
would be to bet a central question about 
animals. 
2For such evidence see In the Shadow of llan (1971), Jane van Lawick-Goodall, pp. 225­-
229; Amon~ the Elephants (1975), lain and 
Oria Doug as-Hamilton; and The Lure of the 
Dolphins (1979); pp. 144-14) and 24-26. 
